Abstract. This paper analyzes the security of a hash mode recently proposed by Yi and Lam. Given a block cipher with m-bit block size and 2m-bit key, they build a hash function with 2m-bit outputs that can hash messages as fast as the underlying block cipher can encrypt. This construction was conjectured to have ideal security, i.e., to resist all collision attacks faster than brute force. We disprove this conjecture by presenting a collision attack that is substantially faster than brute force and which could even be considered practical for typical security parameters.
Introduction
The public cryptographic community has over 20 years of experience in building secure block ciphers. In contrast, the design of cryptographic hash functions has received only about half as many years of research. Yet hash functions are still a very important primitive to practitioners. Therefore, there is much interest in the problem of building a secure, fast hash function out of a secure block cipher.
This research program has been troubled by two major challenges. First, most existing block ciphers have a 64 bit block size, but a hash function with a 64 bit output cannot possibly resist collision search. Therefore, one must somehow securely double the width of the internal state, and this appears to be a nontrivial endeavor. Second, it is hard to maintain efficiency without sacrificing security. The critical figure of merit is the rate of the hash function, which is defined as the number of m-bit message blocks hashed per encryption, where m is the block size of the underlying cipher. Many early proposals for building fast hash functions have been broken; in particular, Knudsen, Lai, and Preneel cryptanalyzed a large class of double-length hash functions of rate 1 [1, 2, 3, 4, 8] .
In ACISP '97, Yi and Lam proposed a new construction for building a hash function from a block cipher (e.g., IDEA) with m-bit block width and 2m-bit key size [10] . Typically, we will have m = 64. The Yi-Lam scheme has rate 1 and yields 2m-bit outputs. With such high performance, it is an attractive candidate for building a fast hash function.
One crucial feature of the Yi-Lam design is the inclusion of incompatible group operations (xor and addition modulo 2 m ) to combine internal state variables. Most previous work had used only xor operations, so that the only nonlinear component was the block cipher; however, Knudsen, Lai, and Preneel's work broke all such hash functions of rate 1 using m-bit keys. The use of incompatible group operations in the Yi-Lam hash is apparently intended to help frustrate those types of attacks.
Nonetheless, in this paper we still manage to find fast collision attacks on Yi and Lam's proposal. Our attacks work by controlling the effect of the "carry bits." This shows that the incompatibility of xor and addition does not add much strength to the Yi-Lam hash mode.
Our primary results are as follows. We describe how to find full collisions for the Yi-Lam hash with 2
.71m work. Also, we give a free-start collision attack (also known as a pseudo-collision attack [6, Section 9.7.2]) that requires only 2 m/2 steps of computation, when the adversary can choose the initial starting state of the hash function. Both attacks are very practical to implement for m = 64. Note that Satoh, Haga, and Kurosawa have previously shown that there are second-preimage attacks against this hash with complexity about 2 m [9] , in contrast to its conjectured 2 2m security level. Thus, we may conclude that the Yi-Lam hash is neither strongly collision-free nor strongly one-way.
Outline. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes Yi and Lam's new scheme briefly, for reference, and Section 3 shows how to find collisions in their proposal. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 4. Appendix A includes a proof of our main lemma on the correlation between xor and addition.
Description of the Yi-Lam Hash
A bit of notation is in order. We write E(k, x) for the encryption of block x under key k. The block cipher is assumed to be free of any weaknesses. Also, x||y stands for the concatenation of two blocks x and y. We let x ⊕ y stand for the xor of x and y, and write x + y for the addition modulo 2 m of x and y. Since Yi and Lam did not name their scheme, we simply call it the Yi-Lam hash in this paper.
The Yi-Lam hash operates as follows. We pad the message and divide the result into k blocks of size m, denoted by M 0 , . . . , M k−1 . The 2m-bit internal state is named G||H and is initialized to a fixed public value G 0 ||H 0 . We denote the compression function by h, and define h by h(G||H, M ) = G ||H , where
. This construction is illustrated pictorially in Figure 1 .
Caution. Beware: there are actually two hashing constructions which could be called "the Yi-Lam hash." One such scheme was proposed in Electronics Letters [11] (and subsequently cryptanalyzed [5] ); another was published in ACISP'97 [10] ; and the two designs are quite different. In this paper, we focus on analysis of the ACISP'97 proposal. To avoid confusion, phrases such as "the Yi-Lam hash" should be understood to refer to the ACISP'97 proposal.
Collision Resistance
In this section, we explore the collision-resistance of the Yi-Lam hash. We exhibit a free-start collision attack with complexity 2 m/2 , and then we extend this to a full collision attack with complexity 2
.71m . This is substantially lower than the conjectured security factor of 2 m for security against collision attacks. For the suggested parameters (i.e., m = 64), even the full collision attack is well within reach of most adversaries in practice, since it requires only 2 .71×64 < 2 46 work.
The free-start attack. First, we describe a free-start collision attack on the Yi-Lam hash, as promised. Calculate
for n = 2 m/2 values of G i , observing that G i = H i for all i. We search for a pair i, j with H i = H j . Then G i = H i = H j = G j , so this produces a pseudo-collision for the compression function.
The total computational complexity of this attack is 2 m/2 encryptions. A naive implementation of this attack might require 2 m/2 units of storage, but we note that using Floyd's cycle-finding algorithm or any of its improvements [7] reduces the storage complexity of the attack to a very small constant.
The full collision attack. In the remainder of this section, we will analyze the security of the Yi-Lam hash against full collision attacks. Let G i ||H i (for i = 1, . . . , n) be any n values for the chaining variables. For instance, we could select
To aid the intuition, let's first consider a variant of the Yi-Lam hash where all additions are replaced by xors. Imagine calculating the values
for n = 2 m/2 arbitrary values of G i ||H i (which could be obtained by hashing n different message prefixes). Then we would have the relation
After about n = 2 m/2 trial hashes, we would expect to find some i = j such that H i = H j by the birthday paradox. This would imply that G i = H i = H j = G j , so this algorithm would give a full collision in this Yi-Lam variant after 2 m/2 trial hash computations.
Of course, the real Yi-Lam hash mixes addition with xor to prevent these sorts of attacks. So we need to extend our analysis to handle the carry bits. We begin by establishing a simple lemma on the incompatibility of xor and addition.
Lemma 1. If a, b, c are independently and uniformly distributed over all m-bit values, then
Proof. See Appendix A.
For the collision attack on the full Yi-Lam hash, we suggest calculating the values
where −H i denotes the additive inverse of H i modulo 2 m . The analysis goes as follows. Suppose that, for some pair i = j, we have
holds with probability > 2 −.42m , so G i = G j with the same probability. With n = 2 .71m trials, we expect to see 2 .42m−1 pairs i, j such that H i = H j , which is enough that with non-negligible probability we expect to see one of them where
To summarize, this shows how to find a collision in the Yi-Lam hash with about 2
.71m offline hash computations. We expect that the storage complexity of the collision-finding attack will be negligible, if parallel collision search techniques are used to implement the attack [7] .
Conclusions
We have shown that the Yi-Lam hash has serious flaws, and it is clear that the construction offers only minor benefits over traditional single-length hash functions.
The fundamental problem is that the Yi-Lam construction relied on the nonlinearity of the carry bits found in modular addition. However, addition possesses only mild nonlinearity properties, and we have seen that in this case they were not enough to resist attack.
We considered a Yi-Lam variant where the addition operation is replaced by an xor operation, and found a relation (see Equation 1 ) between the inputs and outputs of the compression function that is linear over xor. This linear relation allows one to break the variant with a trivial attack. With the addition operation in place, the corresponding relation is no longer xor-linear, but it is nearly so, and this permits a simple extension to the previous attack to handle the slight nonlinearity.
Therefore, our results provide some evidence to suggest that merely including an incompatible group operation in the hash design may not be sufficient to assure security. This does not rule out the possibility that mixing incompatible operations might improve the security of some cipher-based hash functions-at least in the case of the Yi-Lam hash, the inclusion of the addition operation did appear to frustrate certain trivial attacks-but we advise caution. We propose that in the future it would be wise for designers to avoid relying on addition modulo 2 m (instead of xor) too much.
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